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Disappearances in Honduras: The Need
for Direct Victim Representation in
Human Rights Litigation
By CLAUDIO GROSSMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Honduran national Manfredo Angel Velasquez Rodriguez was
taken to a detention center in Tegucigalpa on September 12, 1981, and
was never seen again. He was thirty-five years old when he disappeared,
and left a wife and four small children. Without any judicial process he
was detained, interrogated and tortured, and then disappeared. A peti-
tion concerning the disappearance of Velisquez Rodriguez was filed
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission)
in October of 1981.1 On July 29, 1988, an historic day in the fight
against governmental human rights abuses in Latin America, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights held that the Government of Hondu-
ras was responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo Angel Velfsquez
Rodriguez.2 In this decision, the Court exercised for the first time its
compulsory jurisdiction in a contested case and became the first intema-
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program at Wash-
ington College of Law, American University. Raymond Geraldson Scholar of International
and Humanitarian Law. Ph.D. in Law, 1990, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands; J.D.,
1973, Law School of the University of Chile. The author was one of the attorneys representing
the victims in the cases against Honduras.
1. See Tanoira, Inter-American Court Finds Honduras Guilty of Disappearances, 4 IN,'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 280, 280 (1988).
2. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS/ser. L/V./IIL.19, doc. 13
(1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989) [hereinafter Velhsques Rodriquez Case]. The Com-
mission reviews and determines whether to act on petitions and inquiries alleging violations of
Convention rights. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OEA/ser. K/
XVI/1.1, doc.65, rev. 1, corr. 2 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in ORGANI-
ZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, BASIC DocUMENTS PERTAINING TO HuMAN RIGHrs IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS] 25, OEA/Ser.LV/II.71, doC. 6,
rev. 1 (1988) and 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]. States Parties to the
Convention or the Commission may submit cases to the Inter-American Court. The Court
may exercise compulsory jurisdiction only when the states involved have accepted it. Id. arts.
61, 62. For an overview of the Inter-American system, see Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-
American System for the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW; LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 439 (rheodor Meron ed., 1984).
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tional tribunal to find a State responsible for disappearances.' Although
the Court is empowered with compulsory jurisdiction under Article 62 of
its Convention, prior to this case the Court had only once exercised its
compulsory jurisdiction, and then in an uncontested case.4 The State
concerned, Costa Rica, submitted the case against itself, and agreed to be
bound by the ruling, but the case was dismissed before a final ruling was
reached. Although other OAS member states were accused of resorting
to disappearances of political dissidents, Honduras, which had acceded
to the Court's binding jurisdiction, was the first state subjected to
liability.5
"Disappearance" is a tragic governmental practice developed in the
early 1970s by certain Latin American governments which exterminate
political dissidents, cover up all evidence of the murder and deny all
knowledge of the victims' whereabouts.6 "[A] 'disappearance' has oc-
curred whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person
has been taken into custody by authorities or with their connivance and
the authorities deny that the victim is in custody."'7 In Latin America
the term often means: "Seizure of individuals by military, paramilitary or
police agents of the state, who secretly murder and dispose of the bodies
of their victims, often after torture, always without legal process, and
without acknowledgement or admitted responsibility of the state."8
3. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 194, 28 I.L.M. at 329 (reporting unani-
mous finding of guilt). Any state member of the Organization of American States (OAS) and
authorized OAS bodies may request an advisory opinion from the Court. American Conven-
tion, supra note 2, art. 64. Only states which have accepted the Court's binding jurisdiction by
express declaration may be parties to the exercise of that jurisdiction. Id. art. 62.
4. See In re Viviana Gallardo, Case G 101/81, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 12, OEA/ser. L./III. 7,
doc. 13 (1982).
5. See Linda Drucker, Recent Development, Governmental Liability for "Disappear-
ances" A Landmark Ruling by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 25 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 289, 296 (1989) (noting substantive evidence in case coupled with Honduran accession to
compulsory jurisdiction as determining Honduras as first state party to Court's first conten-
tious case). See also Jill Smolowe, Murderers Most Foul, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 28 (noting
likewise that history of case plus acceptance of jurisdiction made it pcssible to bring case).
6. See Howard M. Kleinman, Disappearances in Latin America: A Human Rights Per-
spective, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1033, 1033 n.5 (1987).
7. Id. (quoting AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTS
14 (1983)).
8. Id. (citing E. HERMAN, THE REAL TERROR NETWORK: TERRORISM IN FACT AND
PROPAGANDA 7 (1982)). See also Drucker, supra note 5, at 290 n.9 (noting use of term arising
from Spanish "desaparecidos," or "disappeared ones," to which attached the connotation of
kidnapping, torture, and execution of activists.
For additional sources concerning the practice of disappearances, see Nigel S. Rodley,
The International Legal Consequences of Torture, Extra-Legal Execution, and Disappearances,
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989) (citing works includ-
ing: J. EGELAND, HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE AGAINST POLITICAL DISAPPEARANCES
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At approximately the same time that the Commission started inves-
tigating the disappearance of Velasquez Rodriguez, the Commission also
opened the case of another Honduran national: Jos6 Saul Godinez Cruz.
Godinez Cruz was also married and had a child when he was captured
on July 22, 1982 by a group of men. Like Velisquez, he was a member of
the academic community working at the Julia Zelaya College. He was
thirty-two when he was last seen.9 On January 29, 1989, the Court held
that Honduras was also responsible for the disappearance of Saul
Godinez Cruz.1° Honduras was ordered to pay compensation in both
cases, an amount which totalled one and a half million lempiras to the
family of Velasquez Rodriguez and one million three hundred thousand
lempiras to the Godinez Cruz family.1" These first decisions of the Court
were extremely important for the development of the Inter-American
system for the protection of human rights.
In neither case, however, were the victims' families permitted to se-
lect their own legal representative in the proceeding. According to the
relevant provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, indi-
vidual parties may only choose legal counsel to represent them before the
Commission. Once the Commission or a state brings the case before the
Court, the Court's statute has been interpreted to allow only the Com-
(1982); R. Reock, "'Disappearances" and the International Protection of Human Rights, Y.B.
WORLD AFFAIRS 166-81 (1982); J. Shestack, The Case of the Disappeared, 8 H. RTS. (1980);
Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Question of the
Human Rights of all Person's Subject to any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Question of
Missing and Disappeared Persons, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 37th Sess., UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1435, Add. 1 (1981); 38th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1492, Add. 1 (1982); 39th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/Sub.2/14 (1983); 40th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/21, Adds. 1,
2 (1984); 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/15, Add. 1 (1985); 43d Sess. U.N. Doc. Vl
CN.4/1986/18, Add. 1 (1986); 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/15, Add. 1; 45th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/19 (1988)).
9. See Godinez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989, Inter-Am Ct. H.R., Decisions &
Judgments (ser. C) No. 5 (1989) [hereinafter Godinex Cruz Case].
The Commission also began investigating the disappearances of Costa Rican nationals
Francisco Fairen Garbi and Yolanda del Carmen Solis Corrales, whose cases were consoli-
dated into a third case. See Fairen Garbi & Soils Corrales Case, Inter-Am Ct. H.R., Decisions
& Judgments (set. C) No. 6 (1989) [hereinafter Garbi & Soils Corrales Case]. Fairen Garbi, a
student, and Solis Corrales, a professor, were traveling together through Honduras en route to
Mexico. They disappeared on December 11, 1981, after being detained by Honduran authori-
ties in Comayaguela. Their families, expecting them home for Christmas celebrations, never
heard from them again. Honduras was found responsible for the disappearances in the first
two cases, but it was unanimously held that there was not sufficient evidence to establish re-
sponsibility in this third case. Id. para. 163(2).
10. Godinez Cruz Case, supra note 9, para. 203.
11. INTER-AM. CT. H.R. PRESS RELEASE, July 21, 1989. CDH-CP7/89. See also Caso
Velisquez Rodriguez, Interpretacion.
19921
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mission to represent the interests of the victim. 2
This Article will examine the Inter-American system and how the
system is impeded by the denial of direct legal representation chosen by
the victims or their families. The Article summarizes the Court's deci-
sion in the Veldsquez case,' 3 which provides a background for discussion
of individual participation in proceedings before the Court. After exam-
ining the position of individuals in classical international law, the Article
evaluates the advisory role given to the victims' lawyers in the Honduran
cases. Next, the Article discusses how the experience of the Honduran
cases, in which the Commission appointed the victims' lawyers as advi-
sors, exposes procedural weaknesses and demonstrates the need for direct
legal representation. Finally, the Article examines the benefits of direct
individual participation, and suggests alternative means to increase indi-
vidual participation in future proceedings before the Court.
II. THE "DISAPPEARANCE" CASES IN HONDURAS
A. The Commission's Procedures
During the 1970s Honduras did not have a reputation for resorting
to disappearances.14 This situation began to change in the 1980s, as
Honduras began to suffer from the effects of the Central American con-
flict.15 As the war in Nicaragua escalated, thousands of foreign troops
were stationed on Honduran soil. 6 The Honduran military accused left-
ist insurgents of carrying on various acts of violence. 17 General Alvarez,
12. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(1) (providing that only states or the
Commission may bring a case to Court), art. 57 (providing "Commilsion shall appear in all
cases before the Court"). See also infra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that direct
representation with petitioner's counsel of choice is possible before Commission, but that once
a case goes to court, the Commission represents petitioner).
13. See Thomas Buergenthal, Introductory Note, 28 I.L.M. 291, 291 (1989) (introducing
reprint of Veldsquez Rodnuez opinion, noting that reasoning used by Court in the Godthez
Cruz Case was nearly identical to that used in Veldsquez Rodnuez).
14. See AMERICAS WATCH ET AL., HONDURAS: ON THE BRINK: A REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS BASED ON A MISSION OF INQUIRY 16 (1984) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH] (noting
disappearances with related abuses as relatively new to Honduras; focusing on 1981 as mark-
ing change).
15. See id. at 1-6, 7, 16-24. Unrest in the region and hostilities in neighboring Nicaragua
prompted increasing governmental concern for Honduran stability and national security and
led to the rising power of the military in addressing these problems. Id. See generally COMMIT-
TEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS, CODEH ANNUAL REPORT: THE
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS (1987) [hereinafter CODEH].
16. See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 14, at 4 (noting use of El Salvadoran, U.S. troops
in training maneuvers); CODEH, supra note 15, at 5 (noting presence of Nicaraguan Contra
contingent in Honduras).
17. See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 14, at 21-22 (reporting that then chief of investiga-
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head of the armed forces and defacto ruler of Honduras, began to resort
to brutal measures of repression.8 From 1980 to 1984, between 100 and
150 Hondurans disappeared after being targeted for extermination by the
armed forces.19
Families of the disappeared, churches, and non-governmental orga-
nizations undertook strenuous efforts to learn the location of those who
had disappeared. The families presented numerous writs of habeas
corpus before Honduran tribunals and contacted embassies, international
organizations, and political parties inside and outside the country. For
example, prior to bringing the disappearance of Velfsquez Rodriguez to
the Commission, petitioners in the case had filed writs of habeas corpus in
1981, 1982, and 1983 in the Honduran courts.20 These writs, however,
were never processed by the Honduran courts.2 1 The victim's father filed
criminal charges in the matter of his son's disappearance,' but the
charges were dismissed? Such actions by families alerted the interna-
tive unit justified number of detentions as security measure; unit investigated persons suspected
of "subversive activity"). Witnesses testified that Velhsquez Rodriguez was accused of political
crimes. Velsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 3, 28 I.LML at 294.
18. See, ,,g., Velfsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 113, 28 LL.M. at 313 (identi-
firing Alvarez' role in authorizing executions); para. 119(a),(b), 28 LL.M. at 314 (commenting
that evidence tended to show a practice of disappearances carried out with the aid or acquies-
cence of the Government and armed forces); para. 147(c), (d), 28 LLM. at 319-20 (finding it
to be proven by the facts that kidnappings, torture, and murder occurred under the aegis or
orders of the military and police); AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS: SIGNS
OF "THm ARGENTINE METHOD" 8-12 (1982) (tracing responsibility for disappearances to
Honduran armed forces, noting that all security forces were under army control, with Alvarez
Chief of the Armed Forces); AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS: CENTRAL
AMERICAN "SmESHOW" 66 (1987) (recording accusations that Alvarez-created battalion was
responsible for disappearances and killings).
19. See, eg., Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 147(a), 28 I.LM. at 318
(estimating 100-150 persons disappeared in Honduras between 1981-84); James LeMoyner,
High Stakes in Nicaragua, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1988, at Al (estimating 140 civilians extermi-
nated by army death squads from 1980-88; noting these are among tens of thousands of civil-
ians terrorized by governments in region); Report of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/15, (1986) (recording that of 168
cases transmitted by a U.N. working group to the Government of Honduras, 139 remained
unresolved).
20. La Comisi6n Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Caso 7920 Desaparici6n
Forzada de Angel Manfredo Velisquez Rodriguez, Observaciones de la Comisi6n Interameri-
cana de los Derechos Humanos, A Ia Memoria Presentada ante i Illustre Corte Interameri-
cana de Derechos Humanos por el Gobierno de Honduras 46-47 OEA/ser.L/V/IL69, doc. 6
(1987) [hereinafter Observaciones].
21. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 179,28 I.L.M. at 314 (showing no such
writ was processed, no judges had access to places of detention).
22. Observaciones, supra note 20, at 47.
23. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, pam. 179, 28 I.LM. at 326. See also id
para. 118, at 314 (noting testimony that courts were slow in naming judges in habeas corpus
cases; often police ignored judges; authorities denied detentions; places of detention were un-
1992]
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tional public to the violations of human rights occurring in Honduras.
The Honduran authorities, however, steadfastly denied any knowledge
of, or responsibility for, the disappearances.24
At the requests of the families and the organizations supporting
them, the Inter-American Commission began investigating the Velasquez
case in October 1981.25 Faced with a lack of cooperation from the Hon-
duran Government, the Commission applied article 42 of its Regula-
tions.26 In accordance with that provision, a party's failure to participate
in proceedings allows the Commission to presume that the facts alleged
by the petitioners are true.27 At the conclusion of the investigation, Hon-
duras was found responsible for the disappearances.
When General Alvarez was expelled in 1984, the new Government
of Honduras requested that the Commission reconsider its decision to
hold the Government responsible for the disappearances, pending the
findings of an internal governmental investigation. 28 The Commission
agreed to reconsider its decision.29 An internal investigation was con-
ducted by a commission composed of six Honduran colonels formed for
known; judges attempting to execute writs were threatened with reprisals, physically mis-
treated by authorities, occasionally imprisoned; further, that not one such writ was effective
between 1981-1984).
24. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, paras. 4, 5, 28 I.L M. at 295 (recounting
procedural history of case and continued denial by Honduran authorities of any knowledge of
Velisquez Rodriguez' whereabouts).
25. Id. para. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 294.
26. Id. para. 4, 28 I.L.M. at 295. The Commission transmitted relevant portions of the
petition to the Government and several times requested a response. Id. Article 42 allows the
facts alleged in a petition to be presumed true when relevant parts of the petition have been
communicated to the referred State and the State has failed to provide information in the time
allotted by the Commission. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (1980, modified 1987) art. 42 [hereinafter Regulations], reprinted in BASIC DOCu-
MENTs, supra note 2, at 90.
27. Regulations, supra note 26, art. 42. Article 42 provides:
The facts reported in the petition whose pertinent facts have been transmitted to the
government of the State in reference shall be presumed to be true if, during the maxi-
mum period set by the Commission under the provisions of Article 34 paragraph 5,
the government has not provided the pertinent information, as long as other evidence
does not lead to a different conclusion.
Id.
28. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 295 (recording that
Government asserted it was investigating case, that domestic remedies had not been exhausted,
and that rumors suggested Velfisquez Rodriguez had joined Salvadoran guerrillas). For results
of Honduran internal investigation, see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
29. Id. para. 6, 28 I.L.M. at 295. The Government asserted that domestic remedies re-
mained. Id. See also Regulations, supra note 26, art. 37(1) (requiring exhaustion of local reme-
dies before Commission will consider petition).
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the purpose of reporting on alleged past disappearances." This commis-
sion's report was four sentences long. It stated only that it could not be
determined whether anyone in the military was connected with disap-
pearances, none of those who had disappeared were in government cus-
tody, background information from which to investigate was vague, and
that there was a general lack of documentation concerning these alleg-
edly disappeared persons.3 When the Honduras colonels' commission
again failed to shed light on the cases, the Inter-American Commission
reacted by reaffirming its prior decision.32
Following requests by the victims' lawyers, the Commission decided
on April 24, 1986 to submit the case to the Court. The Commission
requested that the Court find that Honduras had violated Articles 4
(right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), and 7 (right to personal
liberty) of the American Convention.33 The Commission also asked the
Court to rule that "the consequences of the situation that constituted the
breach of such rights or freedoms be remedied and that fair compensa-
tion be paid to the injured party or parties." '34 The Court accepted the
case subject to procedural challenges to its jurisdiction.
B. The Court's Procedures
On October 31, 1986, the Honduran Government presented the
Court with six preliminary objections, which focused upon alleged proce-
dural errors committed by the Commission in handling the case.35 The
Honduran Government asserted that the Commission failed to take steps
30. See AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONDURAS AFrER GENERAL ALVAREZ
29 (1986).
31. 1,
32. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 10, 28 IL.M. at 295.
33. Case 7920, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 30-31, OEA/ser.L/III.15, doe. 13 (1986). Article 4 of
the Convention sets forth that "[e]very person has the right to have his life respected," and not
to be "arbitrarily deprived of his life." American Convention, supra note 2, art. 4. Article 5
assures that every person has a right to have respect for his "physical, mental, and moral
integrity," and further, that no one shall be tortured or subjected to "cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading punishment or treatment." Those deprived of liberty must be treated with respect for
their human dignity. Id. art. 5. Article 7 mandates that every person has a right to personal
liberty and security, and to be free from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. Id. art. 7.
34. Case 7951, Inter-Am. C.H.L 38, OEA/ser.L/IIL15, doe. 13 (1986). The Commis-
sion transmitted resolutions to the Court, asking it to remedy Honduras' breach of the obliga-
tions listed above in the disappearances of Vellsquez Rodriguez, Fairen Garbi and Sols
Corrales, and Godinez Cruz. Case 7920, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 29, OEA/ser.L/IILI15, doe. 13
(1986) (Resolution No. 22/86) (Honduras); Case 7951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 37, OEA/ser.L/
111.15, doe. 13 (1986) (Resolution No. 23/86) (Honduras); Case 8097, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 39,
OEA/ser..L/III.15, doc. 13 (1986) (Resolution No. 24/86)(Honduras).
35. See Vellisquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987,
Inter-Am Ct. H.R., Decisions & Judgments (ser. C) No. 1.
1992]
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mandated by the Convention: specifically, that the Commission failed to
issue a formal declaration of admissibility, failed to sufficiently exhaust
the requirement of attempts at friendly settlement, failed to conduct a
preliminary hearing, failed to conduct an investigation in Honduras,
failed to issue the proper final report in a timely manner, and failed to
demand that petitioners exhaust what the Government alleged were re-
maining domestic remedies.36 The Commission's legal team refuted all
these objections in its answer dated March 20, 1987.
After hearing both parties on June 15 and 16, 1987, the Court unan-
imously decided to:
1. Reject the preliminary objections interposed by the Government of
Honduras, except for the issues relating to the exhaustion of the do-
mestic legal remedies, which (were) ordered joined to the merits of the
case.
2. [P]roceed with the consideration of the instant case .... 37
On June 26, 1987, the Court asked the parties to present evidence.
The Commission presented both witnesses and documentary evidence;
Honduras presented only documents.38 Hearings to examine and cross-
examine witnesses took place on September 1, 1987.39 On October 7,
1987, the Court summoned three Honduran military authorities to tes-
tify. Testimony of two of the three was heard on January 20, 1988.40
In its final decision rendered on July 29, 1988, the Court held the
Honduran Government responsible for the disappearance of Vela'squez. 4 1
The Court further decided to give the Honduran Government and the
Commission an opportunity to agree on compensation.4 2 If no agree-
36. Id paras. 53, 57.
37. Id para. 94 (joining issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies to merits in light of
connection between domestic authorities, disappearances, domestic remedies).
38. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 137, 28 I.L.M. at 316 (mentioning
lack of active participation by Honduras, noting that case therefore less than adequately
presented).
39. See id para. 29, 28 I.L.M. at 299 (recounting text of Court Order summoning three
witnesses).
40. Id para. 34, 28 I.L.M. at 300. See id para. 31, 28 I.L.M at 299 (explaining Honduran
Government requested those hearings be closed for state security reasons)..
41. Id para. 194, 28 I.L.M. at 329. The Court's judgment of July 29, 1988 in Veldsquez
Rodrtuez was its first decision in three cases submitted by the Commission. See id. para. 35,
28 I.L.M. at 300. The subsequent decision in Godihez Cruz was virtually identical, thus it is
not necessary to summarize them separately. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Hon-
duras was held liable for the disappearance of Godinez Cruz. Godinez Cruz Case, supra note
9, at 85 (1989). In the Fairen Garbi and Sold Corrales cases, however, the Court concluded
that the evidence was insufficient to hold the government liable. Garbi & Soils Corrales Case,
supra note 9.
42. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 191, 28 I.L.M. at 329.
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ment could be reached within six months of the date of the Final Deci-
sion, the Court would fix the amount of compensation to be paid. 3 The
Court proceeded to determine the amount of compensation on July 21,
1989, after the negotiations failed."
In addition to the Commission's request for compensatory damages,
on March 10, 1989, the victims' lawyers presented a brief directly to the
Court which argued that, in addition to compensatory damages, repara-
tions should include: investigation and punishment of those individually
responsible for the disappearances; measures for the public rehabilitation
of the reputation of the victims; and punitive damages. The Court or-
dered a public hearing on the issue of compensation and allowed the vic-
tims' lawyers to present their views directly to the Court. The Court's
final decision on damages addressed the arguments of the victims' law-
yers separately from those of the Commission's legal team.45
C. The Court's Decisions
Both the Court's final decision and the decision on compensation
represent enormous breakthroughs for the protection of human rights in
the hemisphere. In its final decision, the Court interpreted the scope of
some rights and governmental duties laid down in the American Convei-
tion.' It also decided various issues related to proof: standard of
43. I para. 194(6), 28 IL.M. at 330 (specifying Court's retention of jurisdiction over
issue of compensation during negotiations).
44. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R., Decisions & Judgments (ser. C) No. 7 (1989). See also Velisquez Rodriquez
Case, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990, Inter-Am. Ct. -LL 1, 5 (1990) (Interpretation of the Com-
pensatory Damages Judgment).
45. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R., Decisions & Judgments (ser. C) No. 7 (1989).
46. As requested by the Commission, the Court found Honduras responsible for the viola-
tions of article 4 (the right to life), article 5 (the right to integrity of the person, including the
right to dignity and freedom from torture), and article 7 (the right to personal liberty, includ-
ing freedom from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment). Velfsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2,
paras. 155-57, 28 LL.M. at 322-25. The Court ruled further that Honduras' behavior also
violated article 1 of the Convention, concerning the state's obligation to respect the rights of its
citizens. I, paras. 161, 178, 28 LL.M. at 323, 326. The Court held that Honduras affirmative
duty to its citizens requires not only that it refrain from violating specific civil and political
rights, but also that it "ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts,
which, as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indem-
nify the victims for damages." Id. para. 175, 28 I.LM. at 325. To find a government guilty of
a disappearance, the individual perpetrator need not be identified; it is enough to prove
"whether a violation of the rights recognized by the Convention has occurred with the support
or the acquiescence of the government, or whether the State has allowed the act to take place
1992]
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proof,4' burden of proof,4" and admissibility of evidence.4 9 The Court
without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible." Id. para. 172, 28 I.L,M.
at 326.
The Court found that Honduras did not even conduct a proper investigation into the
disappearances, much less enforce its own law in condemning the actions of government offl-
cials. See id paras. 180-81, 188, 28 I.L.M. at 327, 328 (characterizing failure to investigate as
violation of American Convention duty to ensure right to life recognized by article 4).
47. Id. para. 127, 28 LL.M. at 315-16. The Court first noted that an articulated standard
was absent in the Convention, the Court's Statute, and the Court's Rules of Procedure. Id.
The Court stated that an international judicial procedure has to be less formal than its domes-
tic counterpart, because the state, the subject of the complaint, controls "the means to verify
acts occurring within its territory." Id paras. 128, 136, 28 I.L.M. at 316. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, DISAPPEARANCES: A WORKBOOK 78 (1981) [hereinafter DISAPPEARANCES]
(noting that inability to breach governmental efforts to conceal disappearances is an element of
practice of disappearances making it "unique among human rights violations"), The Court
further recognized that the standard of proof is dependent upon the nature, character, and
seriousness of each case. Velfsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 128, 28 IL.M, at 316.
Therefore, the Court had to take into account the seriousness of a finding that a state is guilty
of the practice of disappearance, a practice characterized "by an attempt to suppress all infor-
mation about the kidnapping or whereabouts and fate of the victim." Id. para. 131, 28 I.L.M.
at 316.
The Court concluded that, while the existence of a practice of disappearances must be
established by direct evidence, proof of the disappearance of any one particular individual may
be shown by circumstantial evidence or by inference. Id. para. 124, 28 I.L.M. at 315.
48. See Dinah L. Shelton, Judicial Review of State Action by International Courts, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 361, 379-84 (1989) (discussing the Court's practice in allocating burden
of proof and focusing on judicial burden shifting in Veldsquez RodrAuez). The matter of bur-
den of proof is of great importance due to the nature of the crime of disappearances. Disap-
pearances usually involve a governmental conspiracy of cover-ups, and hence the enforcement
officials responsible for them are unlikely to cooperate in the investigation. See id at 383-84.
49. The Court concluded that it would not consider direct evidence alone because that
type of evidence would be almost impossible to obtain in cases of disappearances attributable
to a government. Velfisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, paras. 131, 140, 28 I.L.M. at 316,
317 (characterizing "this type of repression" by attempts to suppreas all information). Ac-
cordingly, the Court stated that "[c]ircumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be
considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts." Id. para. 130, 28
I.L.M. at 316. The Court felt that otherwise it would be impossible to prove that an individual
had disappeared. Id. para. 124, 28 I.L.M. at 315. The practice of international tribunals using
indirect evidence has long been affirmed. See id para. 127, 28 I.L.M. at 315-16 (comparing
Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Ireland), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9), and Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 IC.J. 4 (June 27)).
The Court accepted a wide range of evidence offered by the Commission. It accepted
documents as authentic and truthful when Honduras did not object to them. Id. para. 140, 28
I.L.M. at 317. Also, the Court held that although newspaper clippings offered as evidence by
the Commission were not "documentary" evidence, they were admitted either to corroborate
testimony, for evidentiary value, or simply because they contained information described by
the Court as "public and well-known facts." Id. para. 146, 28 I.L.M. at 318. The Government
objected to the Commission's use of certain witnesses, arguing that they were not impartial
because during cross examination the witnesses stated that they opposed the Alvarez dictator-
ship. Id. para. 142, 28 I.L.M. at 317. The Court found that a witness could not be disqualified
solely on the grounds of his or her political views toward a given government. Id. para, 143,
28 I.L.M. at 317-18 (holding that allegation of bias "is insufficient to rebut testimony which is
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described the crime of disappearance s° further defined the scope of the
obligation to exhaust local remedies,51 and established procedures for
compensation of victims.52 Finally, the Court ordered the Government
fundamentally consistent with that of other witnesses"). See also id. para. 144, 28 LL.M. at
318 (specifying "human rights are higher values not derived of nationality, but rather of "at-
tributes of [the] human personality").
50. The Court's opinion is the first explicit description of disappearances given by an in-
ternational tribunal. Id. para. 147, 28 I.L.M. at 318-20 (examining facts of case in context of
pattern of practice). For a discussion of disappearances and an analysis of how they relate to
international law, see Maureen R. Berman & Roger S. Clark, State Terrorism: Disappearances,
13 RUTGERS L. 531 (1982). The authors note that the term desaparecido arose from the mid-
1960s practice of the Guatemalan Government where death squads abducted and killed forces
hostile to the government. Id at 531 (citing DISAPPEARANCES, supra note 47, at 75).
The Court found that individuals considered dangerous to the state's security first were
put under surveillance. A second step was detention, either openly by the security forces, or
kidnapping by disguised military personnel in unmarked vehicles. Velasquez Rodriguez Case,
supra note 2, at 65, para. 147, 28 I.L.M. at 318. The victims were then interrogated and
subjected to "cruel and humiliating torture treatment." Id pam. 147(d)(iii), 28 LL.M. at 319.
Those murdered were buried in clandestine graves. I& Finally, the authorities would deny
any knowledge of the victim's whereabouts. I&. pars. 147(d)(iv), 28 IL.M. at 319. Applying
the aforementioned framework to the present case, the Court concluded that the Commission
had proven that:
(1) a practice of disappearances carried out or tolerated by Honduran officials existed
between 1981 and 1984; (2) Manfredo Vellsquez disappeared at the hands of or with
the acquiescence of those officials within the framework of that practice; and (3) the
Government of Honduras failed to guarantee the human rights affected by that
practice.
I para. 148, 28 I.L.M. at 320-21.
One might further note that, although the practice of disappearances has been pervasive
in Latin America, particularly the southern cone, it has been utilized throughout the world.
Berman & Clark, supra at 532 (listing examples of countries where disappearances have been
reported: Afghanistan, Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea), Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, the
Philippines, and Uganda). Numerous other countries have carried out disappearances on a
lesser, or less publicized, scale. See generally Report of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, supra note 19.
51. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, paras. 63-64, 28 I.LM. at 305-06. The
Court interpreted article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention, which requires that domestic
remedies be exhausted in accordance with "generally recognized principles of international
law." Id. para. 63, 28 I.L.M. at 305 (quoting art. 46(lXa) of the American Convention, supra
note 2). The Court held that principles of international law do not refer only to the formal
existence of such remedies, but also to their "adequacy and effectiveness." Id The Court went
on to explain that adequate domestic remedies are "those which are suitable to address an
infringement of a legal right," id. para. 64, 28 LL.M. at 305, and that an effective remedy is
one capable of producing the result for which it was designed. Id. paras. 64, 66, 68, 28 I.LM.
at 305-06.
While the complaining party has the burden of proof on the merits of the case, that rule
does not apply to exhaustion of domestic remedies. Shelton, supra note 48, at 381. The state
has the burden of proving that domestic remedies remain and, if utilized, will be effective. If
the state is successful, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that the remedies were
exhausted or that such remedies fall within the exceptions of article 46(2). Id. at 381-84.
52. Velisquez Rodriquez Case, supra note 2, para. 194, 28 I.LM. at 381-84. The Court
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of Honduras to pay compensation. 53
Notwithstanding the value of the Court's first decisions, the Hondu-
ran cases illustrate the need for further development of the Inter-Amen-
can system. In the Honduran cases, the Court decided that the
questioning of three summoned Honduran military personnel would not
be public. 4 In the future, questioning of witnesses should always be con-
ducted publicly.
Additionally, responsibility of the Honduran Government for the
killing of two witnesses was not sufficiently explored." A former Hon-
duran army sergeant, Jos6 Isaias Vilorio, was to appear and testify at
trial 6 He was killed two weeks before his scheduled appearance, his
body found draped with the standard of a leftist group. 7 Human rights
groups, including the Honduran Human Rights Commission, claimed
the Government carried out this assassination. In the same month, Janu-
ary of 1988, another trial witness was assassinated along with a compan-
ion while they were sitting in a parked c.ar. This witness, Miguel Angel
Pav6n, had testified against the Government of Honduras in September
of 1987.58
The Court formally condemned the two killings. On January 15,
1988, the Court adopted a resolution: (1) acknowledging the deaths of
two witnesses, and that others had received threats; (2) considering the
moral, procedural, and legal implications of these actions; and (3) resolv-
ing to urge Honduras to prevent further infringements, and to investigate
and impose punishment for the crimes. 59 Faced with a lack of full coop-
eration from Honduras, however, the Court could have requested au-
thorization from Honduras to send a member of the Court to Honduras.
ordered that Honduras pay compensation to the families of the victims. Id. The Commission
and Honduras were ordered to negotiate the amount of compensation, but the Court retained
jurisdiction during the negotiation process. Id. If no agreement had been reached after six
months, the Court would have deemed it necessary to step in and determine the amount of the
awards to the families of the victims. Id. paras. 178-85, 28 I.L.M. at 329-30.
53. Velfsquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R., Decisions & Judgments (ser. C) No. 7 (1989).
54. Vellsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 33, 28 I.L.M. at 300.
55. Id paras. 40-41, 28 LL.M. at 301.
56. Id
57. See id. para 40, 28 I.L.M. at 301.
58. Id
59. Velisquez Rodriguez, Fairen Garbi & Sols Corrales, and Godinez Cruz Cases, In-
terim Protection Order of Jan. 15, 1988, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA/ser. L./V./Ill.19, doc. 13
(1988). See also Velisquez Rodriguez, Fairen Garbi & Sols Corrales, and Godinez Cruz
Cases, Interim Protection Order of Jan. 19, 1988, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 27, OEA/ser. L./V./
111.19, doc. 13 (1988) (recording further Court action requiring specific steps to be taken by
Honduras to protect witnesses and to investigate crimes against them).
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This judge could have conducted interviews with Honduran authorities
and others with information about the killings.
The Court also failed to deal with other issues of import to the fami-
lies of the disappeared. The Court's decisions did not address specifically
the issue of punishment of the individuals responsible for disappearances,
nor did they address specific measures to rehabilitate the reputations of
the disappeared.'
The victims were not directly represented in the proceedings before
the Court. While representation by lawyers of the victims' own choice
was possible before the Commission, the victims were not allowed to
choose lawyers to represent them before the Court. The establishment of
individual rights at the international level-a process that started after
the Second World War-has not yet been developed to its full potential
to allow individuals to act at the international level in defense of their
rights.
I. PARTICIPATION BY INDIVIDUALS
A. Classic International Law and the Rights of Individuals
Traditional international law was not concerned with the individ-
ual.6 While there were some earlier instances of recognition of the
rights of individuals, the change in this area was fueled mainly by the
crimes committed by the Nazis before and during World War 11. After
the War, the international community identified international crimes for
60. The Court said in its final decision that Honduras remained obligated to research the
crimes and punish those individuals responsible but did not include any measures in the opera-
tional part of its decision. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 174,28 I.LM. at
325 (noting state's legal duty to investigate, punish those found responsible, and ensure com-
pensation for victims, but specifying no measures). See generally Thomas Buergenthal, To
Respect and to Ensure State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (discussing states' responsibilities to ensure
rights of its citizens). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to Investi-
gate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL L REV. 449
(1990) (discussing treaty, customary law basis for such duty).
61. Through history, individuals traditionally have had to rely on the protection of states
to preserve their human rights. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of
the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L Rav. 1, 1-13 (1982) (tracing evolu-
tion of human rights protections and gradual incorporation of individuals as subjects of inter-
national law independent from states). The participation of individuals in international court
proceedings represents an elevation of the position of the individual, but the modem law con-
tinues to contain some of the jurisprudence and procedural rules of the past. Id at 6-7. See
also Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1-21 (1973) (setting forth historical views of position of individual in international law
and including a bibliography of works concerning status of individual in international law).
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which individuals in addition to states would be held :responsible.62 The
international community also started developing an International Bill of
Rights, which would identify both substantive rights and procedures to
protect those rights. 63 The process resulted in the recognition of individ-
uals' rights at the international level, but procedural rights allowing indi-
viduals to defend themselves have not yet been fully achieved.
As with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, individuals are
not permitted to participate directly in cases before the International
Court of Justice. The Statute of the International Court of Justice pre-
cludes individuals from initiating proceedings before the Court: "Only
States may be parties in cases before the Court."" Individuals are lim-
ited to claiming violations of their internationally recognized rights in
petitions presented to various United Nations organs and special com-
mittees or rapporteurs. 6' At that level they are entitled to their own legal
representation.
In regional systems established under the European and American
Conventions on Human Rights, individuals are allowed direct represen-
tation before the regional commissions. However, until 1982 no direct
representation was permitted before any regional system's courts.66 The
62. See generally Sohn, supra note 61, at 9-16 (tracing effect of World War II in revolu-
tionizing human rights). The Charter of the International Military Tribunal defined crimes
against humanity. See Annex to London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals ofthe European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 288. The Nuremberg principles were recognized by the United Nations as set-
ting forth international law. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by
the Charter of the Nuremberg tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
63. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res.
217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 56 (1948). See generally HERSCH LAurERPACHT, AN INTER-
NATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1945); Egon Schwelb, The Influence of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law, 53 A.S.I.L. PROC, 217
(1959); THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); J. Humphrey, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character, in
HUMAN RIGHTS THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21 (B. Ramcharan
ed., 1979).
64. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34(1), 59 Stat. 1031,
1055, T.S. No. 993.
65. GUIDE To INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE (Hurst Hanum ed., 1988)
(describing U.N. procedures); see also TON J.M' ZUIJDWUK, PETITIONING THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: A STUDY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 1-103 (1982) (discussing evolution of U.N. machinery to
address complaints of human rights violations).
66. The Inter-American system, according to article 61(1) of the Convention, provides:
"Only the States Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a case to the
Court." American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(1). The European system similarly states:
"Only the High Contracting Parties and the Commission shall have the right to bring a case
before the Court." European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 44, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 246 [hereinafter
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European Court changed its practice in that year to allow direct repre-
sentation.67 The Inter-American Convention permits victims' lawyers to
request participation in proceedings before the Court as advisors to the
Commission.68 However, lack of direct representation still poses serious
problems for individuals because it is uncertain whether representation
through other international actors will satisfy the individual's need for
justice.
Individuals cannot be certain that states will act favorably on their
behalf simply because their human rights have been violated. State ac-
tion is usually based upon economic, political, or security concerns,
rather than solely humanitarian considerations.6 9 Organs of interna-
tional organizations, particularly bodies of independent experts, are bet-
ter prepared than are states to act on behalf of victims of human rights
violations.7' However, organs such as the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights also represent interests beyond those of the individ-
European Convention]. The Statute of the International Court of Justice likewise precludes
individuals from initiating proceedings before the Court: "Only States may be parties in cases
before the Court." Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34(1), 59
Stat. 1031, 1059, T.S. No. 993. Protection of the rights of individuals depends substantially on
a state's exercise of diplomatic protection or on the intervention of national or international
organizations. See P.T. Muchlinski, The Status of the Individual Under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Contemporary International Law, 34 INT'L & CoMP. L Q., 376,
381- (1985) (discussing limited changes in practice of European Court of Human Rights as
necessary response to problems of protecting individuals).
67. The European system, like other systems, does not allow individuals to bring cases to
the Court; however, the European system does permit a petitioner direct representation before
the Court. See Revised Rules of Court, 1982 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 5, 14, Rule 30(1),
effective Jan. 1, 1983 [hereinafter EOR. Cr. H.R.] which provides:
The applicant shall be represented by an advocate authorized to practice in any of
the Contracting States and resident in the territory of one of them or by any other
person approved by the President. The President may, however, give leave to the
applicant to present his own case subject, if need be, to his being assisted by an
advocate or other person as aforesaid.
IdL
68. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 124 (allowing Commission to seek assistance of victims'
lawyers).
69. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTIcE 330-61
(1985) (characterizing governmental motives behind decisions concerning human rights instru-
ments, enforcement of norms therein as consisting primarily of "judgments of national inter-
ests, the attitudes of influential elites, and to some degree underlying political philosophies and
cultural beliefs" - clearly distinct from legal character of instruments, norms).
70. See i. (commenting that despite pressure from political factors, regional bodies such
as Inter-American Court of Human Rights are "committed to a non-partisan examination of
the facts and the law").
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ual.71 For example, they may consider the resources involved in a given
case, the existing political framework, and the impact the case will have
on the system as a whole.72 For these reasons, the victims in the Hondu-
ran cases sought active involvement through representation by lawyers of
their own choice in the pursuit of their claims. Active involvement was
essential to enable participation in planning the strategy to be imple-
mented before the Court and to support and protect the victims'
interests.
B. Representation of Individuals in the Honduran Cases
Once the Commission brought the Honduran disappearance cases to
the Court, the victims' lawyers identified and analyzed three possible op-
tions to confront the dangers arising from the lack of direct representa-
tion. The first was to cooperate informally with the Commission. This
approach would have left the cases entirely under the Commission's con-
trol with only marginal power for the victims' families. Furthermore, the
families would have no access to information as a matter of right and
would have few opportunities to express their views on the litigation
strategy.
A second option was to ask the Court to reinterpret or change its
rules to allow for direct individual representation.73 This option did not
appear viable because, in the lawyers' opinion, the Court would not risk
engaging in liberal procedural interpretations that might cause the Hon-
duran Government to leave the proceedings. Furthermore, courts often
create procedural breakthroughs when they decide on the merits against
a plaintiff. The lawyers did not wish to risk winning the procedural point
only to lose on the substantive matter.
The third option, and the one finally chosen, was to request the
Commission to appoint the lawyers as legal advisors under article 21 of
the Commission's Regulations. 74 This option was particularly attractive
71. See id. (noting that even regional nonpolitical bodies such as Inter-American and Eu-
ropean Courts of Human Rights are not immune to political concerns).
72. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (concerning lack of financial resources); see
also J. Lauchlan Wash et al., Conference Report - The Inter-American Human Rights System:
Into the 1990"s and Beyond, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 517, 529-35, 543 (1988) (exploring
ramifications of political considerations on system's effectiveness, pointing out probable weak-
ening in resolutions and other activities, due to individual state fears of being targeted in the
next resolution) [hereinafter Conference Report].
73. See Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979), reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 105-115.
74. See Regulations, supra note 26, art. 71, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 2,
at 75-115.
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because it followed prior European practice, and the Inter-American sys-
tem had been modeled upon the European Convention on Human
Rights." Until 1982, when the European Court formally changed its
rules to allow for individual representation, the European Commission
developed the practice of appointing the victims' lawyers as advisors in
cases before the Court." Under this option, the Commission, not the
victims, would have technical control over the case. The victims' law-
yers, however, believed that their knowledge of the case and their per-
sonal links with members of the Commission and its secretariat assigned
to the case lessened the risks of working under the Commission's
direction.
After the victims' lawyers were appointed as legal advisors to the
Commission, they were given the opportunity to participate in planning
the legal strategy for the case. The strategy of the Commission was in
fact greatly influenced by the participation of the victims' lawyers. Ex-
amples of such contributions to the case are the treatment of the Court as
a trial court and pursuit of a strategy to depoliticize the proceedings.
The Court could have been treated as either a trial court or as an appel-
late court. Because this was the first contested case to be taken to the
Court, the procedure before the tribunal could be somewhat shaped. The
lawyers foresaw that the Honduran Government's strategy would be to
focus on procedural matters. Since the victims' lawyers were convinced
that disappearances had taken place, they thought that the Honduran
Government would try to avoid discussion on the merits, and instead
would try to focus on technical procedural matters. Moreover, the Com-
mission had not strictly followed the letter of the American Convention
concerning admissibility, friendly settlement, and exhaustion of local
remedies. This provided opportunities for Honduras to complain on
technical grounds. The victims' lawyers then suggested that the Com-
mission bring the merits to the forefront, requiring the trying of the case.
Focusing on the merits instead of procedural matters facilitated con-
centration on the inhumanity of disappearances, rather than on dry tech-
75. See Kevin Boyle, Practice and Procedure on Individual Applications Under the Euro-
pean Convention, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PRAcTIcF, supra note 65,
133, 143-44 (describing European Commission's approach to legal representation before the
Court).
76. See Muchlinski, supra note 66, at 376-78. The European Court in the Lawless case
recognized the direct interest of the individual petitioner but did not grant him procedural
recognition (citing Lawless v. Ireland, I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.1, at 1 (1960). Later, in the
Vagrancy case, the delegates of the European Court requested the assistance of the petitioner's
lawyer, and the Court agreed. Id at 379 (citing Vagrancy Case (De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v.
Belgium), 1 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) No.14, at 373 (1970).
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nicalities. This, in turn, had more potential to mobilize public opinion,
and contribute to "education" in human rights. To achieve their goals,
the victims' lawyers suggested treating the Court as a trial court, as op-
posed to an appellate body. The Commission decided to follow this rec-
ommendation. Accordingly, witnesses and documentary evidence could
be introduced by the lawyers. When the Commission presented evi-
dence, neither Honduras nor the Court objected. Thus, the Commission
achieved its goal without discussion. This participation, achieved with-
out an explicit legal framework, led the Court to adopt new Rules of
Procedure in 1991, 7 formally allowing victims' lawyers to act under the
Commission's guidance.78
The victims' lawyers also wanted to depoliticize the proceedings.
The lawyers thought that Honduras might leave the procedure if it could
argue that the Commission and the lawyers were ideologically motivated.
Also, they thought that it would be easier for the Court to hold against
Honduras if the case were more "technical" than "political." As this
was the first case of its kind, politicization could have threatened the
integrity of the whole system. To achieve their goal, the lawyers con-
stantly advised against including political matters in the case to avoid
detracting from the legal matters at issue. Applying this strategy, broad
political matters, such as the causes of the Central American conflict,
were avoided.
The victims' lawyers, the victims' families, and the non-governmen-
tal organizations supporting the victims were able to identify important
witnesses for the case. Thus, the lawyers had an invaluable opportunity
to suggest to the Commission names of witnesses who could testify on
such matters as the pattern of disappearances carried out in Honduras,
the role of the security apparatus, and the role of the judiciary. They
gathered evidence, wrote legal memoranda, and suggested witnesses.
They also played an active role in the Court proceedings by examining
and cross-examining witnesses, arguing different aspects of the Commis-
sion's case, and presenting the closing arguments in conjunction with the
Commission's lawyers.
The participation of the victims' lawyers greatly benefitted the Com-
mission, the Court, and the process as a whole. For example, the Com-
mission lacked the personnel and material resources to handle the case
77. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, adopted January
1991, entry into force Aug. 1, 1991, preliminary draft translation subject to review (on file with
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L Rev.) [hereinafter 1991 Rules].
78. Id. art. 22 (2).
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fully.79 Only two lawyers were assigned by the Commission. The inclu-
sion of the victims' lawyers as advisors enriched the Commission's work
and enlarged its legal team. The victims' lawyers knowledge of the case
made them indispensable to the Commission for the purpose of gathering
evidence and identifying witnesses. These lawyers also assisted the Com-
mission by securing outside funding to pay the expenses of witnesses who
testified in Costa Rica.
The strengthening of the Commission's work resulting from the ad-
dition of the victims' lawyers also benefitted the Court because the
proper administration of justice requires that all necessary facts and legal
reasoning be brought to the Court's attention. Additionally, the partici-
pation of these lawyers contributed to the legitimacy of the system as a
whole. Through their lawyers, the families of the victims and the non-
governmental organizations supporting them felt represented in a proce-
dure which otherwise would have involved only states and the
Commission.
Despite these benefits, some fundamental shortcomings of the strat-
egy of indirect representation were demonstrated in the Honduran cases
and have implications for future cases. For the most part, the victims'
lawyers and the Commission's lawyers agreed on strategy, but differences
of opinion did arise. For example, the victims' lawyers wanted the Com-
mission to take a more aggressive stand against the Honduran Govern-
ment for its failure to cooperate with the Court in the investigation of the
killing of two witnesses. The victims' lawyers wanted the Commission to
petition the Court to order the Honduran Government to punish those
responsible for the disappearances and to pay punitive damages. Addi-
tionally, the close personal relationships existing between the victims'
lawyers and those of the Commission created a positive working atmos-
79. See Claudio Grossman, Proposals to Strengthen the Inter-American Sstem of Protec-
tion of Human Rights, 32 GERMAN Y.B. IN,'L L 264, 274-75 (discussing organizational limi-
tations within system, including insufficient staff or resources for examination and
investigation of petitions, lack of financial support). See also Conference Report, supra note 72
(explaining basic procedures and analyzing current role of Inter-American Commission and
Court, and making recommendations for enhanced future effectiveness). Inherent constraints
on the system's effectiveness include the system's mandates that the Commission attempt
friendly settlement, and that petitioners exhaust domestic remedies completely. Id. at 540.
See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 48(l)(f) (providing that Commission will facilitate
friendly settlement); and art. 46(l)(a) (setting forth that domestic remedies must be exhausted
for Commission to accept a petition), art. 46(2) (providing that requirement be met unless
domestic remedies are not provided, or petitioner is denied access to them, or judgments are
unreasonably delayed by the state). Because the Inter-American system is inter-governmental
in nature, it is particularly difficult to protect the Court's ability to apply Convention princi-
ples in a neutral political context. Conference Report, supra note 72, at 542-43.
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phere in this case. This important personal factor may not exist in future
situations. The absence of such cooperation could lead to insurmounta-
ble divisions on legal strategy that could result in the victims' disaffection
with the entire system.
The Commission's discretionary power to appoint victims' lawyers
as advisors not only fails to guarantee participation by victims, but also
creates difficulties for the Commission. It is not in the Commission's
interest to open itself up to pressure from governments,'which could seek
to prevent the appointment of certain victims' lawyers. Even if the Com-
mission were always to appoint the victims' lawyers as advisors, impor-
tant problems would remain. The lawyers would act under the
Commission's direction and this direction could become distorted be-
cause the Commission performs roles other than representing the inter-
ests of the victims. Dissatisfied victims could then blame the
Commission for the manner in which the proceedings were conducted or
for negative results. Moreover, broader policy goals would be served by
direct representation in the Inter-American system.
C. Valuable Policy Goals Served By Direct Representation in the
Inter-American System
The desire to voice one's views about issues that affect one's life is a
fundamental attribute of the human personality. Violations of human
rights are attempts to silence that voice. Guaranteeing the presence of
the victims' voices in judicial proceedings is thus of paramount
importance.
Full individual participation can reduce human rights abuses by
confronting the repressive goal of silencing victims, developing social ac-
ceptance of peaceful solution of conflicts, and enriching judicial proceed-
ings. Each of these will be addressed in the following sections.
1. Confronting the Goal of Repression
Repressors reject any interference with their exercise of power.
They would like their will to be translated without question into action.
To achieve their goals, repressive governments resort to intimidation and
misinformation.80 Domestically, they want their citizens to believe that
they are omnipotent and that no protection is available for those who
80. See Kleinman, supra note 6, at 1038-39 (describing effect of forced disappearances on
relationship of state to society). Exercise of state power through disappearances allows a state
to evade legislative and judicial controls on its authority, and to make ineffectual such non-
governmental controls as the media; instead the state effectuates the psychological effects of
state repression. Id. See also Berman & Clark, supra note 50, at 536-40 (examining disappear-
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defy them. Internationally, they seek to avoid negative public opinion
and interference by foreign governments or international organizations.81
They want to send the message that internal opposition to their rule is
isolated and forgotten.
International reactions can breach that isolation. Consequently,
strengthening international human rights norms and enforcement mech-
anisms will undercut the purposes and the means of repression. Direct
access to international fora by individuals is an essential means to con-
front repression.
Direct access allows individuals "to tell their story" on an interna-
tional level. For victims, being able to tell "their truth" is valuable in
itself. It also allows victims to confront oppressors who may deny their
very existence. Direct access empowers those who, in the view of their
oppressors, were supposed to be totally helpless.
Direct representation is consistent with the actual behavior and ex-
pectations of the victims. For example, in the Honduran cases, the fami-
lies of the victims were extremely active before both the Inter-American
Commission and the Inter-American Court. They constantly provided
their lawyers with information, suggestions for strategies, and advice as
to the political ramifications of the case. Their behavior expressed the
deeply rooted belief in the right to pursue one's own case.
2. Social Acceptance for the Judicial Solution of Conflicts
Victims confronted with an inoperative judiciary lose their confi-
dence in the existence of peaceful means of redress. For this reason, the
existence of an authoritative judiciary is essential to the rule of law."
When the domestic judiciary fails, exposure to and participation in inter-
national judicial institutions can create trust in the concept of impartial
justice. This trust can result in an overall reinforcement of the rule of
law. Direct representation before an international court would thereby
strengthen the belief of individuals in the crucial role of the judiciary in
the peaceful solution of societal problems.
ances as method by which government removes physical and juridical opposition, and by
which government evades both national and international controls).
81. See J. Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORO'N
599 (1986) (discussing subject of human rights as "intensely threatening" for states; states
prefer to avoid outside scrutiny of domestic rights practices).
82. See Resolution XXXI of the Ninth International Conference of American States
(1948), Inter-American Court to Protect the Rights of Man, recorded in CONFERENCES OF
AMERICAN STATES, 1942-54, at 270 (2d Supp. 1958) (reporting Conference considered crea-
tion of court to protect human rights necessary "inasmuch as no right is genuinely assured
unless it is safeguarded by a competent court").
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3. Enriching Judicial Proceedings
In addition to general societal goals of promoting peaceful settle-
ment, direct representation by the victims adds another legal actor to
court proceedings. This new actor can suggest witnesses, bring evidence,
and file motions, thereby increasing the court's opportunities to establish
the truth.
In principle then, direct representation before courts should be al-
lowed and encouraged. After all, the right to bring one's own grievance
directly to a tribunal is a widely accepted institution of civilized behavior.
These reasons convinced the European Court on Human Rights to
modify its rules in 1982 to allow for direct victim representation.8 3 The
Inter-American system, which had adopted the European Court's origi-
nal denial of direct victim representation,84 has been left copying a model
no longer in existence.85
IV. MEANS TO ACHIEVE DIRECT REPRESENTATION
Two different options to achieve direct representation are available
in the Inter-American system. The first option is to interpret the existing
legal provisions as allowing such representation. A second option would
be to modify the text of the Court Rules to expressly permit direct
representation.
A. Interpreting the Existing Legal Framework.
Under the new Rules of Procedure adopted by the Inter-American
Court, victims' lawyers appointed as legal advisors by the Commission
can participate in proceedings before the Court.86
The Rules of Procedure explicitly set forth norms concerning that
participation.87 They include provisions requiring that families be in-
83. See supra notes 66, 67, 76 and accompanying text (discussing changes in European
system procedures).
84. See generally Bums H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparl-
son and Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (1987) (comparing existing regional
human rights systems, European and Inter-American Systems). See also Thomas Buergenthal,
The American and European Conventions on Human Rights: Similarities and Differences, 30
AM. U. L. Rnv. 155 (1980).
85. See Thomas Buergenthal, Human Rights in the Americas: View from the Inter-Amerl-
can Court, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 303, 303-05 (1987) (acknowledging European system's role as
model; distinguishing, however, current difficulties of European, Inter-American systems).
86. 1991 Rules, supra note 77, art. 22 (2).
87. Id. (requiring the Commission to inform the Court if the lawyers for the original
petitioner are among the Commission legal advisors).
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formed of the cases;" notification of the victims' lawyers, 9 as well as
consultation on certain aspects of the proceedings;9 notification of pre-
liminary measures; 91 and the right to appear before the Court' and to
question witnesses and other relevant persons.93 The Court has to record
the presence of all participants in the proceedings, including the victims'
lawyers,94 who have the opportunity to review the transcripts."
The new procedural rights given to the victims' lawyers include the
right to be consulted when the case is withdrawn by one of the parties,'
or when the case is settled. 97 When a case is settled, the Court is empow-
ered to decide to continue the proceedings.9"
Under article 44(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may re-
quest that the representatives of the victims express their views when it
decides on the appropriate penalties to be imposed upon a guilty party."
The Court Rules of Procedure allow them to articulate their views on
punishment, orally or in writing, irrespective of the Commission's opin-
ion. Under article 34, the Court may order provisional measures at any
stage of the proceedings in grave cases or in the case of imminent irrepa-
rable damage to persons.oo The lawyers of the victims are free to re-
88. Id art. 28(1) (stating that as soon as a case is filed, the Secretary of the Court must
send copies of the filing to the original petitioner, the alleged victim, and his or her family).
89. Id. art. 28(3) (stating that the Secretary of the Court is to request respondent state to
designate an agent. If appropriate, Commission is to appoint Delegates within two weeks of
notice pursuant to articles 21 and 22 of the Court Rules).
90. Id art. 29(2) (noting that the Court's President will consult with the Commission's
delegates and the agents of the respondent state as to the needs for further written procedural
steps).
91. Id art. 31(3) (requiring the Secretary of the Court to "immediately transmit" prelimi-
nary objections to interested parties listed in article 28(1)).
92. Id art. 33 (designating that the President of the Court directs hearings, sets order of
participation).
93. Id art. 41(2) (explicitly allowing the lawyers of the victims serving as Commission
delegates to question witnesses, experts, and all other persons summoned by the Court).
94. Id art. 42(1)(b) (ordering the Court to record all the participants in each session,
including the representatives of the victims).
95. Id art. 42(2) (giving a right to the delegates, including the representatives of the vic-
tims, to receive a copy of the transcripts in order to correct any mistakes), ar. 42(4) (entitling
the delegates to receive a final copy of the transcript).
96. Id art. 43(1) (explicitly requiring the Court to hear the lawyers of the victims in the
event that the Commission decides to withdraw from the case).
97. Id art. 43(2) (specifying that the Court must hear the lawyers of the victims when the
parties communicate to the Court that they have reached an out of court settlement or other
solution.)
98. Id art. 43(3) (stating that Court may continue case in spite of petitioner's desire to
discontinue, or in spite of offer to settle).
99. Id art. 44(2).
100. Id art. 24 (allowing the Court to take provisional measures upon motion of party, or
at own discretion).
1992]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
quest such measures. Finally, article 29 mentions the Commission's
delegates generically, a reference that could also include the representa-
tives of the victims working on the Commission's team.1"1 Similarly, ar-
ticles 30 and 32 both use the term "delegates," without differentiating
between the Commission's own staff and the representatives of the
victims. 102
The Rules of Procedure do not state explicitly that the Commission
is required to appoint victims' lawyer as legal advisors. The Commis-
sion's failure to do so, however, amounts to a violation of the letter and
spirit of the Inter-American system of protecting human rights. Article
61 of the Convention only excludes victims from submitting a case to the
Court, but does not preclude direct representation after submission.10 3
In fact, the Convention as a whole supports the premise that victims have
a right to direct representation once a case has been submitted.
Denial of the right to direct representation can be interpreted as a
violation of the Convention's due process requirement. Under the Con-
vention denial of due process is not limited to violations in the domestic
legal system of a state party."° The minimum judicial guarantees re-
quired under due process apply also to the workings of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court itself.105 These due process guarantees should be applied
except when expressly modified by the Convention. The Convention
only excludes the victim from submitting a case to the Court; the Con-
vention does not exclude the right to direct representation. This inter-
pretation is supported by article 8 of the Convention, which establishes
due process and should be liberally interpreted. As the European Court
noted in its Delcourt decision, "In a democratic society.., the right to a
fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a restric-
tive interpretation of [provisions related to due process] would not corre-
spond to the aim and the purpose of that provision." 106 The same
reasoning certainly would apply to article 8 of the American Convention,
which sets forth due process requirements, and to article 25 of the Con-
101. Id. art. 29.
102. Id. arts. 30, 32.
103. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 61Q) (permitting only a state on the Commis-
sion to bring a case to the Court).
104. See id. art. 8(I) (setting forth right to hearing within reasonable time, with appropri-
ate guarantees by competent tribunal for determination of any rights, or freedoms).
105. Id. art. 25(1) (providing everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any
other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that vio.
late his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by
this Convention).
106. Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) No. 11, at 305 (1970).
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vention, which refers to judicial protection.107
Article 29 of the American Convention establishes standards to in-
terpret the Convention.1"8 This provision should be read to require an
interpretation of the Convention that recognizes the right of direct repre-
sentation. Article 29(a) does not permit an interpretation that would re-
strict a right to a greater extent than set forth in the Convention. 1°9 The
Convention only restricts the right of the victims to submit a case di-
rectly to the Court.110 Furthermore, section (c) of article 29 does not
allow an interpretation that would preclude rights or guarantees that are
inherent in the human personality."' The right to have a lawyer of one's
own choosing is such an inherent right. Finally, section (d) of article 29
establishes that the Convention shall not be interpreted to exclude or
limit the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 12 Ar-
ticle 18 of that instrument recognizes the right to a fair trial.' 3 Denial of
the right of victims to choose their own lawyers would also violate the
American Declaration. The Court itself has said that the humanitarian
purpose of human rights treaties should be taken into account when in-
terpreting such treaties." 4 In contrast to treaties establishing reciprocal
rights and obligations for state parties, human rights treaties should be
107. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8, 25.
108. Id art. 29. Article 29 provides that the Convention may not be interpreted to allow
the suppression of rights and freedoms granted in the Convention. Id art. 29(a). The Conven-
tion may not be interpreted to restrict rights and freedoms granted by a state's laws, or by
another convention, including the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; nor
may the Convention be interpreted to preclude exercise of rights "inherent in the human per-
sonality or derived from representative democracy." Id art. 29(b)-(d).
109. Id art. 29(a) (specifying that interpretation of Convention may not restrict rights or
freedoms granted in Convention to greater extent than provided for in Convention).
110. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 2, para. 6,28 I.LM. at 331 (Piza Escalante,
J., dissenting on issue of compensation) (explaining that while individual is precluded from
bringing case to Court, this should not be interpreted to restrict victim's role as autonomous
party in Court proceedings).
111. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 29(c).
112. Id art. 29(d) (providing Convention is not to be interpreted to limit effects of Ameri-
can Declaration or other similar "international Acts").
113. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 18 (1948), reprinted in
BAsIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 2, at 17, 21 (setting forth right to fair trial for every person).
114. See The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention
on Human Rights arts. 74,75), Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, INTER-AM.
Cr. H.R., Ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 2 (1982). In this opinion the Court looked to
the nature of the Inter-American Convention as "a multinational legal instrument or frame-
work enabling States to make binding unilateral commitments not to violate human rights of
individuals within their jurisdiction." Id para. 33. The Court made its interpretative determi-
nation in light of that context, finding that the purpose of the instrument would be better
served by an interpretation furthering its humanitarian aims. Id para. 34.
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interpreted in favor of individuals.1"' The right of victims to choose their
lawyers is an expression of such an interpretation.
While the new Rules of Procedure fall short of explicitly stating the
right of victims to direct representation, the Rules allow the Court to
appoint victims' lawyers as advisors if the Commission does not. In fact,
denial of such representation would be a violation of the Convention it-
self. Article 22(c) of the Rules suggests the need for the Commission
always to appoint the victims' lawyers as members of its defense team.11 6
Consequently, if the Commission fails to make such an appointment, the
Court could authorize it. It would also violate article 24 if the Court
rejected a request in a grave case for provisional measures requested by a
victim.1 7 Rejection of evidence put forward by the victims' lawyers and
failure to take into account the victims' views on proper remedies would
also violate the Court's obligation to recognize the humanitarian pur-
poses of the Convention. This interpretation of the Rules of Procedure is
justified because they must be consistent with the Convention, which
only excludes victims from directly bringing a case to the Court.
B. Modification of the Court Rules
Another option is for the Court to modify its Rules of Procedure to
allow direct representation-following the European model.118 This op-
tion would have the advantage of avoiding any dispute concerning the
right to direct representation. Lack of modification, however, should not
be construed as a denial of the right to direct representation, because
such a denial would be a violation of the Convention itself.
V. CONCLUSION
After the Honduran experiences, the Court is again considering con-
tentious cases, which signals a promising development in the strengthen-
ing of the Inter-American system. There are three new cases before the
115. See id at para. 29. The Court distinguished the American Convention from the more
traditional "reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit" of states, finding that human
rights treaties have as their object the submission of states to "a legal order within which they,
for the common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other states, but towards
all individuals within their jurisdiction." Id. (examining in support recognition of distinction In
nature of human rights treaties from other types of treaties by European Commission on
Human Rights in Austria v. Italy, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 116, 138, 140 (Eur. Comm'n
on H.R.)).
116. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 22(2).
117. Id. art. 24.
118. See supra notes 67, 76 (addressing change in European Court of Human Rights prac-
tice to allow direct representation).
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Inter-American Court, two against Suriname and the other against
Peru.1 19 The Court's involvement could contribute greatly to the Inter-
American system of protecting human rights. Application of the Ameri-
can Convention by a tribunal, and not just by political or quasi-judicial
bodies, will advance the rule of law. Recognition of the rights of individ-
uals to act on their own behalf before the Court by choosing their own
counsel significantly ensures this development.
The Veldsquez case contributed to the evolution of human rights
norms by exposing and delegitimizing the inhumane practice of disap-
pearances. The case also demonstrated that individuals not willing to
accept disappearances should be entitled to bring their claims to interna-
tional organs. The Court and the Commission should continue to
strengthen the system by recognizing the right of individuals to direct
representation. This is consistent not only with the goal of the system to
protect human rights but also with the victims' own just expectations.
119. There are two cases against the Government of Suriname pending before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. Case 10.274, Asok Gangarom Panday Case; Case 10.150,
Aleoboetoe y Otros Case. The case against Peru is known as the El Froton case. Case 10.070.
The petition against Peru was fled on May 10, 1990, alleging assaults against journalists Hugo
Bustios Saavedra and Eduardo Rojas Arce following threats from military personnel Bustios
Saavedra was killed, and Rojas Arce was injured. The author is a legal advisor to the Commis-
sion on behalf of the victims in the Surinam cases.
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